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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S. H. BENNION, 
v. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
GULF OIL CORPORATION, a 
Pennsylvania corporation and 
the UTAH STATE BOARD OF OIL, 
GAS AND MINING, an agency of 
the State of Utah, 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 19144 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to the facts recited in Appellant Bennion's 
Brief the following additional facts are pertinent in reply to 
Respondent Gulf's Brief: 
A. Case History of the CS0-7024 litigation. 
As noted in Appellant's previous recitation of facts, on 
or about August 25, 1980, the drilling of the Albert Smith 2-8CS 
Well, the second well drilled in the same drilling unit by Gulf, 
was approved only by a staff petroleum engineer, not the Board of 
Oil, Gas & Mining (hereinafter the "Board") as an infield test 
well. 
By letter, Mr. Bennion requested the Board to enjoin 
drilling of the 2-8C5. Because tbe Board would take no acti01 
Bennion sought injunctive relief in Third District Court in 
Bennion v. Gulf Oil Corporation, No. CS0-7024, pursuant to 
Section 40-6-9(d) U.C.A. (1953), as amended, to stop the dril 
of the second well (R. 126). Mr. Bennion asserted that thew 
was being drilled unlawfully inasmuch as the Board didn't aut 
ize its drilling and two wells could not be drilled in one un 
After this case was filed and a hearing on plaintiff' 
Mction for Preliminary Injunction, the proceedings in Civil N 
C-80-7024 were continued on September 24, 1980 to allow the B 
to hold an emergency hearing the next day to address the issu 
whether or not drilling the second well should be stopped. N 
questions were certified by the Court to the Board. (See 
Reporter's Transcript of September 24, 1980, Hearing.) 
As the hearing was held on September 25, 1980, and th 
Board issued Emergency Order in Cause No. 139-20 (R. 154). T 
Order determined that (1) the drilling of the 2-8C5 as an inf 
test well was lawful, (2) drilling should not be enjoined, si 
it was only a test well, and (3) the plaintiff was not requir 
to pay any costs of the well at that time because it was a te 
well. The Board deten:1ined further that any designation of t 
2-8C5 well as the unit production well would have to be done 
pursuant to notice and hearing. As of the time of his hearin 
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however, the well was not authorized to replace the then produc-
ing unit production well. 
Due to the action finally taken by the Board resulting in 
the Order in Cause No. 139-20 from which Bennion could appeal the 
parties entered into a stipulation for dismissal of Action No. 
C-80-7024. The Stipulation provided that: 
An Order may be entered in this cause dismissing the 
above-entitled action with prejudice and on the 
merits upon the grounds that said action has been 
rendered moot and the issues raised herein decided 
by an emergency Order of the Board of Oil, Gas and 
Mining dated October 3, 1980. 
The Order was subsequently entered. 
B. The Record on Appeal includes the Rupp Affidavit 
dated December 31, 1982. 
In addition to the above, Gulf has raised a need for 
further facts to be stated in regards to the record before the 
lower Court. Gulf has stated on pages 4-5 of its Brief that 
documents, including the Orders in Cause Nos. 139-8, 139-20 and 
139-20(B) and Production Reports for both the Albert Smith l-8C5 
and 2-8C5 wells for the years 1980 through 1982 which were 
attached to an Affidavit of Stephen W. Rupp dated December 31, 
1982, were not before the lower court and were not filed with the 
Court until March 3, 1983, the same day of the lower court's 
Hemorandum Decision. Therefore, Gulf argues these crucial 
documents should not be considered by this Court. 
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The fact is that Mr. Rupp' s Affidavit and attached 
documents were presented to the lower court the day of the 
hearing on January 4, 1983. The documents were betore the lower 
court during argument and were part of the case file for purposes 
of the lower court's deliberation. (See Judge Hanson's September 
30, 1983, Order contained in Supplemental Record on Appeal). 
Gulf's claim to the contrary is completely false and Judge 
Hanson's Order, prompted as a direct result of Gulf's misstate-
ment, clarifies conclusively the Record on Appeal. (See 
Reporter's Transcript of September 26, 1983, hearing in Supp. 
Record.) 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
WHETHER OR NOT ACTION NO. 80-7024 WAS RES JUDICATA IS NOT 
AN ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT. 
This case before this Court results from an appeal of the 
administrative Order in Cause No. 139-20(B) from which Bennion 
claims adverse effect due to the Board's designation of a second 
well in Section 8 as a production well and the assessment of all 
costs of the second well to owners. The most substantial argu-
ment in Gulf's brief is that a dismissal of Civil Action No. 
80-7024 pursuant to Stipulation of the parties is dispositive of 
the issues raised in this case. 
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A. The trial court, by implication, has already rejected 
the res judicata argument and Gulf has failed to cross 
appeal the ruling. 
Although Gulf did not plead res judicata as an affirma-
tive defense in its answer to plaintiff's Complaint, it exten-
sively argued the point in its Memorandum of Points and Author-
ities submitted to the lower court in support of its cross motion 
for summary judgment (R. 56-59). The lower court, however, 
necessarily rejected Gulf's res judicata argument inasmuch as it 
decided this case on the merits and granted Gulf's cross motion 
for summary judgment based upon its interpretation of the law 
pertinent to this case. The lower court's judgment plainly and 
clearly expresses the grounds for its decision (R. 143-144, 
238-239). The court did not dismiss plaintiff's claim as being 
res judicata. Since a determination of the res judicata issue is 
a threshold question prior to determining this case on the 
merits, clear implication necessarily compels the conclusion that 
the lower court decided against Gulf on the res judicata ques-
t ion, or it never would have decided this case on the merits of 
the parties respective motions. 
Gulf's argument in its Brief concerning res judicata is 
procedurally improper and inappropriate inasmuch as Gulf has 
failed to perfect any appeal with this court claiming that the 
lower court committed error in not dismissing plaintiff's com-
plaint for res judicata. It is respectfully submitted that this 
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court is now presented with res judicata arguments on questions 
that are procedurally not properly before the court, and only 
serve to unnecessarily obfuscate the legal issues involved in 
deciding whether or not the lower court's ruling on the merits 
was correct. 
Gulf's arguments on res judicata, already rejected below, 
are not issues legitimately before the court. It is axiomatic 
that issues not appealed cannot be issues for determination by 
this Court. 
B. The C80-7024 litigation is not res judicata. 
Assuming arguendo, that this Court determines res 
judicata to be an issue properly before this Court, it is submit-
ted in any event the CS0-7024 litigation is not res judicata. 
Bennion's Complaint in Civil Action No. 80-7024 sought 
injunctive relief from the drilling of the 2-BCS Well as an 
infield test well. The action was commenced for the reason that 
the Board had refused to take action concerning the drilling of 
this second well in Section 8 and the respective rights and 
obligations of parties in interest. The civil action was con-
tinued when an emergency hearing before the Board was provided. 
It must be remembered that the civil action and the issues 
addressed by the Board concerned the drilling of the 2-8CS Well 
as an infield test well. There had not yet been any application 
or designation of the well for production. 
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As a result of the emergency hearing, the Board issued 
its Order in Cause No. 139-20 which approved the drilling of the 
second well as a test well. The Order further determined that 
the plaintiff was not required to pay any costs of drilling the 
2-8CS at that time because the well was a test well. (See Order 
139-20, Paragraph III.) At that point the Board had addressed 
all issues before it. (See Paragraph 6, p. 3 of the same Order.) 
Dismissal of Action No. 80-7024 was then proper since the 
Board had taken action and the issues concerning the drilling and 
costs of the 2-8CS as a test well had been addressed by the Board 
by Order from which action might be taken pursuant to Section 
40-6-10 U.C.A. (1953), as amended. 
Once the Board had acted plaintiff's action for injunc-
tive relief and the issues in that context no longer needed to be 
decided since there was now a Board Order addressing the issues 
from which action might be taken. The issues raised in Action 
No. 80-7024 need be viewed in the context of the Complaint for 
injunctive relief. That was the only remedy sought from the 
Court. Dismissal of the Complaint seeking injunctive relief has 
no res judicata effect on an action in the nature of an appeal of 
an administrative order taken the Board's Case No. 139-20(B) 
Order. 
The only issues raised and properly before the Court 
concerned the injunction of the drilling of the 2-8CS as a test 
well. There was no issue of designation for production before 
- 7 -
the Court or Board since no designation nor application for 
designation had yet even occurred. 
11. 
CONTRARY TO GULF'S CONTENTION, THE BOARD HAD A MAtIDATE 
NOT TO DESIGNATE THE 2-SCS WELL FOR PRODUCTION AND TO 
ENSURE ECONOMICAL AND EFFICIENT PRODUCTION. 
A. There was no meaningful evidence taken by the Board 
upon which to base its evaluation. 
Gulf argues that the Board is mandated by law to desig-
nate the 2-SCS for production because of its duty to promote 
recovery of oil and gas. This argument completely ignores the 
purpose, intent and protection afforded all interested parties by 
law and previous Order of the Board of Oil and Gas. 
Section 40-6-1, U.C.A. (1953), as amended, reads in its 
entirety as follows: 
It is declared to be in the public interest to 
foster, encourage and promote the development, production 
and utilization of natural re.sources of oil and gas in 
the State of Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste, 
to authorize and provide for the operations and develop-
ment of oil and gas properties in such a manner that a 
greater ultimate recovery of all oil and gas may be 
obtained and that the correlative rights of all owners be 
fully protected; to encourage, authorize and provide for 
voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling, pressure 
maintenance and secondary recovery operations in order 
that the reatest ossible economic recover of oil and 
gas may be o taine. wit in t e State to t e end that the 
landowners, the royalty owners, the producers and the 
general public may realize and enjoy the greatest possi-
ble good from these vital resources. (Emphasis added) 
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It is appellant's position that the foregoing statutory 
provision and other pertinent language scattered throughout the 
provisions of the Oil and Gas Conservation Act compel and require 
any unit production well to operate in an efficient and econom-
ically prudent manner. The Board must make a finding of what is 
economically practical and prudent in order to avoid the kind of 
circumstance that is before this Court in order that the "correl-
ative rights of all owners be fully protected", and that waste is 
not committed. 
In the case at bar, as reflected in the production 
records (R. 167-178), the production figures for oil recovered in 
the last 12 months of operation of the two wells drilled in 
Section 8 are as follows: 
l-8CS First Unit Well 
(Marcn;-T9"80 - February, 1981) 
10,230 total barrels 
852 barrels average per month 
2-8CS Second Unit Well 
(oetO'ber, 1981 - September, 1982) 
7,687 total barrels 
640 barrels average per month 
The significance of the above computation is obvious. 
The l-8CS well is not only a better producing well than the 2-8C5 
well, but also, as of the time it was shut in, all of its cost 
had been recouped. The 2-8C5, which the Board authorized as the 
unit well without any geologic or economic data in front of it, 
cost in excess of $1,400,00. The Board authorized it and shut-in 
the l-8C5 well even though Gulf didn't even know it was going to 
be a commercial well. Gulf's only witness testified as follows: 
- 9 -
MR. CHAIRMAN: You don't even know if it is going to be a 
co=ercial well '1 
MR. ANTHONY: No, we don't know that. The only thing we 
do know is that it was making approximately 60 barrels of 
oil. We have no idea of what the extent of the reservoir 
is. We can't know that at this time. We realize that 
this whole field is . . . apparently the reservoir due tbe 
geologic structure of the thing - its almost impossible 
to determine what's going to happen from one well to the 
next as far as correlating said new production. (R. 
203-204) 
The only relevant, though inadequate finding by the Board 
in reference to the producing of the well was that the l-8CS was 
at a "point of marginal recovery of further oil and/or gas." 
(Order No. 139-20(B) at paragraph 6.) There was a fatal lack of 
any finding or evidence regarding economic justification for 
shut-in of the l-8CS and production of the 2-8CS. 
Thus, even though the 2-8C5 well is apparently less 
productive than the l-8CS well and cost a tremendous amount of 
money to drill, the Board shut in the well whose costs had been 
totally recouped and authorized as the unit well a more expensive 
unproductive well upon which there was no evidence that it was to 
be a corrnnercial well. Clearly, if the Board considered the 
necessary relevant available data, it would have been in a better 
position to evaluate the economic merit of designating 2-8C5 well 
as the unit production well. Section 40-6-6(d) required that 
enough evidence be presented to justify a modification ot tbe 
Unit Drilling Order. This was not done, nor required, and the 
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production of the second well should be found to be in violation 
of the Act. 
Furthermore, Gulf's interpretation of § 40-6-1, pertain-
ing to what it considers the Board's mandate, would require that 
the Board must approve every application to designate another 
well for production. This kind of reasoning defeats the purpose 
of drilling units and would virtually never allow disapproval 
since another well, even though it might only produce one barrel 
of oil, and thus provide "greater ultimate recovery." 
B. Gulf Should be Required to Account and Credit Bennion 
For the Salvage Value of the l-8CS Well. 
Gulf has argued further that Bennion should not be 
credited with any salvage value of the l-8CS until the well is 
plugged and abandoned. Gulf offers no support for such a con-
tention. The argument also fails to address the obvious conse-
quences and implications of such a ruling. 
First, Gulf could repeatedly drill and equip wells at the 
total cost of owners without even abandoning a previous well, the 
cost of which it has fully recouped. There is obviously no 
incentive to abandon the well. 
Second, if in fact the supposed sufficient justification 
for production of the second well and shut-in of the first 
existed, there would seem to be no question that the first should 
be abandoned. Gulf's argument would leave such a decision 
completely to its own whim. 
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Third, adopting defendants' reasoning demonstrates the 
necessity of seeking modification of the Unit Drilling Order. In 
the case of modification the owner is not subject to duplicative 
cost since all the costs of each one well on each unit has been 
justified. In this case if modification had been sought and 
approved, the owners would still be receiving their return on the 
paid out l-8C5 and there would have been a finding that the 
Drilling Unit Order should be modified so as to allow the 2-8C5 
to be a producing well for another smaller unit. In that case 
the owners' rights would be protected. In this case they are 
not. 
III< 
THE BOARD'S PROCEDURE COMPLETELY DISREGARDS ITS 
STATUTORY MANDATE TO PROTECT RIGHTS. 
ln response to point 3 of Gulf's Brief, appellant prelim-
inarily submits that the comunitization agreement covering 
Section 8 and the "accumulation of a huge amount of evidence 
presented to the Board in numerous causes since the promulgation 
of the order in Cause No. 139-8" are not part of the record on 
appeal in this case. For purposes of argument, however, appel-
lant concurs with respondent's claim that Section 8 is composed 
of numerous mineral interest owners, some leased and some un-
leased. Gulf's argument, if it is understood correctly, is that 
the correlative rights of the working interest owners have not 
been prejudiced as a result of the Board's procedure in 
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authorizing the production of the No. 2 well and concomitant 
imposition of its cost upon the interest owners. Gulf's argument 
completely ignores the facts of this case inasmuch as Mr. Bennion 
and the other interest owners in the unit have been deprived of 
the right to receive the oil and gas production from the No. 1 
well without any concomitant costs, in exchange for what appar-
ently is production from a less productive well which will take 
many years to pay out in order that the interest owners receive 
the production free of costs. 
Hr. Bennion, of course, is now being deprived of his full 
share of production inasmuch as Gulf now has the right to deprive 
him of seven-eights of his share of production to pay for his 
proportionate share of the costs of the No. 2 well. Mr. Bennion, 
through his proportionate share of production, pays his propor-
tionate share of the costs of the second well in its entirety. 
Gulf's claim that he has not risked a penny is beside the point 
because that claim does not provide justification for unrea-
sonably and imprudently depriving Mr. Bennion and all of the 
other interest owners in the unit from the production of a more 
productive paid out well. Such a claim also completely fails to 
recognize the fact that the position Mr. Bennion finds himself in 
vis-a-vis Gulf is statutorily defined in Sec. 40-6-6-(g) (h) of 
the Oil and Gas Conservation Act . If respondent believes Mr. 
Bennion's position is so untenable, its argument is with the Utah 
Legislature, not with Mr. Bennion. 
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CONCLUSION 
To a great extent Gulf's arguments demonstrate the 
impropriety of the Board's Order designating the 2-8CS for 
production. Gulf recognizes at page 16 of its Brief the huge 
amount of evidence confirming the wisdom of 640-acre spacing 
units and at page 4, in quoting their own expert, the lack of 
evidence to change such spacing. Gulf, however, fails to recog-
nize the additional concern in the establishment of that size of 
unit that the recovery from the unit would justify the expense of 
drilling one well. Obviously had the potential recovery justi-
fied the costs of drilling two wells, the units would have been 
so spaced. Now Gulf argues that even though the potential 
recovery does not justify the modification of the spacing unit 
another well should be designated for production anyway since it 
made the irreversible error of unilaterally seeking approval and 
drilling a less than marginally productive test well. 
The lower Court should be required to enter summary 
judgment for Bennion requiring the Board to shut in the second 
well, determine its production and the assessment of its costs to 
be error, and to reinstate the operation of the first well. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this of October, 1983. 
McKAY, 
and 
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